The American keiretsu and universal banks: Investing, voting and sitting on nonfinancials' corporate boards

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Santos, JAC; Rumble, AS
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.03.011
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 419-454
• 关键词: Boards of directors; bank directors; trust business; voting rights; cash rights

摘要

This paper investigates the equity investments and voting rights that American banks control through their trust business. The paper also studies whether the voting rights American banks control through their trust business help explain their presence on firms' corporate boards. We find that on average the largest 100 American banks control 10% of the voting rights of S&P 500 firms. We also find that there are several firms in the S&P 500 index in which the top banks control more than 20% of their voting rights, and several firms in the country in which these banks control more than 60% of their voting rights. Our investigation into the presence of American bankers on corporate boards shows that bankers are more likely to join the boards of firms in which they control a large voting stake. We also find that banks' lending relationships help explain bankers' board memberships. Our results further show that bankers who have both a voting stake in a firm and a lending relationship with it have a higher likelihood of joining the firm's board of directors. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights. reserved.