Determinants of corporate cash policy: Insights from private firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gao, Huasheng; Harford, Jarrad; Li, Kai
• 署名单位: Nanyang Technological University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.04.008
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 623-639
• 关键词: CASH HOLDINGS; Financing frictions; Agency conflicts; Private Firms; Excess cash; Speed of adjustment

摘要

We provide one of the first large sample comparisons of cash policies in public and private U.S. firms. We first show that despite higher financing frictions, private firms hold, on average, about half as much cash as public firms do. By examining the drivers of cash policies for each group, we are able to attribute the difference to the much higher agency costs in public firms. By combining evidence from across public and private firms as well as within public firms across different qualities of governance, we are able to reconcile existing mixed evidence on the effects of agency problems on cash policies. Specifically, agency problems affect not only the target level of cash, but also how managers react to cash in excess of the target. (c) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.