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作者：Crane, Alan D.; Koch, Andrew; Michenaud, Sebastien
作者单位：Rice University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; DePaul University
摘要：We examine the impact of investor coordination on governance. We identify coordinating groups of investors (cliques) as those connected through the network of institutional holdings. Clique members vote together on proxy items: a one standard deviation increase in clique ownership more than doubles votes against low quality management proposals. We use the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal to show that this effect is causal. These findings suggest coordination strengthens governance via voice. ...
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作者：Aragon, George O.; Li, Lei; Qian, Jun QJ
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Fudan University
摘要：Corporate bond mutual funds increased their selling of credit protection in the credit default swaps (CDS) market during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This trading activity was primarily in multi-name CDS, greater among larger and established funds, and directed toward counterparty dealers in financial distress. Funds that sold credit protection during the crisis experienced greater credit market risk and superior post-crisis performance, consistent with higher expected returns from liquidit...
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作者：Antill, Samuel; Grenadier, Steven R.
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We model a firm's optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either Chapter 11 reorganization or Chapter 7 liquidation. Creditors anticipate equityholders' ex-post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex-ante credit spreads. Using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization, we show that the off-equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage, even with liquidation in equilibrium. If reorganization is le...
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作者：Infante, Sebastian
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：This paper presents a model of repo intermediation in which dealers intermediate secured financing between lenders and borrowers using the same collateral. Lenders are insulated from dealers through their repo's collateral, but borrowers are exposed to dealers through the loss of their collateral. This makes lenders' repo terms insensitive to dealers' default, while borrowers' repo terms are not. The model shows that when repos serve to intermediate collateral, haircuts are negative. This pape...
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作者：Schultz, Paul; Song, Zhaogang
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：We examine the introduction of mandatory post-trade reporting in the To-Be-Announced mortgage-backed securities market. With post-trade reporting, trading costs fell for institutional investors. Trading costs declined more for investors' trades with peripheral dealers than for their trades with core dealers. Peripheral dealers' market share dropped after the introduction of post-trade reporting, suggesting that opacity was protecting inefficient high-cost dealers. Interdealer trades and volume...
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作者：Chen, Zhanhui; Yang, Bowen
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University
摘要：Time-preference shocks affect agents' preferences for assets with different durations. We consider longevity risk as a source of time-preference shocks and model it in the recursive preferences setting. This implies a consumption-based three-factor model, including longevity risk, consumption growth rate, and the market portfolio, where longevity has a negative price of risk. Empirically, this model explains many well-known cross-sectional portfolios. Notably, we find that longevity risk and t...
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作者：Aggarwal, Reena; Dahiya, Sandeep; Prabhala, Nagpurnanand R.
作者单位：Georgetown University; Johns Hopkins University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland Baltimore
摘要：This paper asks whether dissent votes in uncontested director elections have consequences for directors. We show that contrary to popular belief based on prior studies, shareholder votes have power and result in negative consequences for directors. Directors facing dissent are more likely to depart boards, especially if they are not lead directors or chairs of important committees. Directors facing dissent who do not leave are moved to less prominent positions on boards. Finally, we find evide...
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作者：Nikolov, Boris; Schmid, Lukas; Steri, Roberto
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Duke University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
摘要：In contrast to cash holdings, credit lines give firms financial flexibility by providing liquidity contingent on realized funding needs, but they are often limited by collateral and covenants. We embed this trade-off into an estimated dynamic model of financing and investment. Our model highlights the relevance of drawing down credit lines to fund investment options in an effective way and quantitatively matches well the levels and dynamics of cash, credit lines, and leverage. In the cross-sec...
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作者：Corum, Adrian Aycan; Levit, Doron
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper studies the role of activist investors in the market for corporate control. Our theory proposes that activist investors have an inherent advantage relative to bidders in pressuring entrenched incumbents to sell. As counterparties to the acquisition, bidders have a fundamental conflict of interests with target shareholders from which activist investors are immune. Therefore, unlike activists, the ability of bidders to win proxy fights is very limited. This result is consistent with t...
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作者：Ben-David, Itzhak; Birru, Justin; Rossi, Andrea
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Arizona
摘要：We study whether industry familiarity is an advantage in stock trading by exploring the trading patterns of industry insiders in their own personal portfolios. To do so, we identify accounts of industry insiders in a large data set provided by a retail discount broker. We find that insiders trade firms from their own industry more frequently. Furthermore, they earn abnormal returns exclusively when trading own-industry stocks, especially obscure stocks (small, low analyst coverage, high volati...
