The power of shareholder votes: Evidence from uncontested director elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aggarwal, Reena; Dahiya, Sandeep; Prabhala, Nagpurnanand R.
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Johns Hopkins University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland Baltimore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.12.002
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 134-153
• 关键词: Director elections; Director reputation; Shareholder voting; Proxy advisor

摘要

This paper asks whether dissent votes in uncontested director elections have consequences for directors. We show that contrary to popular belief based on prior studies, shareholder votes have power and result in negative consequences for directors. Directors facing dissent are more likely to depart boards, especially if they are not lead directors or chairs of important committees. Directors facing dissent who do not leave are moved to less prominent positions on boards. Finally, we find evidence that directors facing dissent face reduced opportunities in the market for directors. We also find that the effects of dissent votes go beyond those of proxy advisor recommendations. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.