Corporate control activism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Corum, Adrian Aycan; Levit, Doron
• 署名单位: Cornell University; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.02.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1-17
• 关键词: acquisition; corporate governance; Proxy fight; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; takeover

摘要

This paper studies the role of activist investors in the market for corporate control. Our theory proposes that activist investors have an inherent advantage relative to bidders in pressuring entrenched incumbents to sell. As counterparties to the acquisition, bidders have a fundamental conflict of interests with target shareholders from which activist investors are immune. Therefore, unlike activists, the ability of bidders to win proxy fights is very limited. This result is consistent with the large number of activist campaigns that have resulted with the target's sale to a third party and the evidence that most proxy fights are launched by activists, not by bidders. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.