作者：CASON, TN
摘要：The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to conduct annual auctions of emission allowances. Under the discriminative auction rules, sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids. This paper studies an inverted version of this auction in which buyers face the same incentives as sellers in the EPA auction. Consistent with theoretical predictions, buyers bid above their valuation auction outcomes are inefficient, and increasing the number of buyers increases bids. Buyers facing human o...
作者：MIYAGIWA, K; OHNO, Y
作者单位：Oregon State University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper explores the linkage between protection and the speed with which a protected firm adopts new technology. Of primary importance here is the distinction between permanent and temporary protection on the one hand, and between tariffs and quotas on the other. We find that a permanent tariff speeds up adoption, but a permanent quota delays adoption unless the quota is highly restrictive. However, temporary protection (i.e., protection that remains effective until the firm adopts new tech...
