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作者：SEN, A
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作者：MARCOUILLER, D; YOUNG, L
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
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作者：AVERY, C; HEYMANN, SJ; ZECKHAUSER, R
作者单位：Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
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作者：CASON, TN
摘要：The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to conduct annual auctions of emission allowances. Under the discriminative auction rules, sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids. This paper studies an inverted version of this auction in which buyers face the same incentives as sellers in the EPA auction. Consistent with theoretical predictions, buyers bid above their valuation auction outcomes are inefficient, and increasing the number of buyers increases bids. Buyers facing human o...
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作者：KEITH, A
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作者：BERGSTROM, TC
摘要：This paper explores the evolutionary foundations of altruism among siblings and extends the biologists' kin-selection theory to a richer class of games between relatives. It shows that a population will resist invasion by dominant mutant genes if individuals maximize a ''semi-Kantian'' utility function in games with their siblings. It is shown that a population that resists invasion by dominant mutants may be invaded by recessive mutants. Conditions are found under which a population resists i...
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作者：KEANE, MP; RUNKLE, DE
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
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作者：MIYAGIWA, K; OHNO, Y
作者单位：Oregon State University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper explores the linkage between protection and the speed with which a protected firm adopts new technology. Of primary importance here is the distinction between permanent and temporary protection on the one hand, and between tariffs and quotas on the other. We find that a permanent tariff speeds up adoption, but a permanent quota delays adoption unless the quota is highly restrictive. However, temporary protection (i.e., protection that remains effective until the firm adopts new tech...
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作者：Hochman, O; Pines, D; Thisse, JF
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：We show that space matters in designing the optimal provision of local public goods (LPG's). Geography imposes a particular institutional structure of local governments due to the overlapping of market areas associated with different LPG's, The optimum can be decentralized through local governments that have jurisdiction over market areas of all LPG types. This implies that the appropriate suppliers of LPG's are metropolitan governments which finance them through user charges and land rent. in...
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作者：COLLINS, SM
作者单位：Brookings Institution
