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作者：Chu, Yongqiang
作者单位：University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
摘要：This paper studies how the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors affects corporate payout policy. Using mergers between lenders and equity holders of the same firm as shocks to the shareholder-creditor conflict, I find that firms pay out less when there is less conflict between shareholders and creditors, suggesting that the shareholder-creditor conflict induces firms to pay out more at the expense of creditors. The effect is stronger for firms in financial distress.
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作者：DeAngelo, Harry; Goncalves, Andrei S.; Stulz, Rene M.
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Most firms deleverage from their historical peak market-leverage (ML) ratios to near-zero ML, while also markedly increasing cash balances to high levels. Among 4,476 nonfinancial firms with five or more years of post-peak data, median ML is 0.543 at the peak and 0.026 at the later trough, with a six-year median time from peak to trough and with debt repayment and earnings retention accounting for 93.7% of the median peak-to-trough decline in ML. The findings support theories in which firms de...
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作者：Bretscher, Lorenzo; Schmid, Lukas; Vedolin, Andrea
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Duke University; Boston University
摘要：We revisit evidence of real effects of uncertainty shocks in the context of interest rate uncertainty. We document that adverse movements in interest rate uncertainty predict significant slowdowns in real activity, both at the aggregate and at the firm levels. To understand how firms cope with interest rate uncertainty, we develop a dynamic model of corporate investment, financing, and risk management and test it using a rich data set on corporate swap usage. We find that interest rate uncerta...
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作者：Musto, David; Nini, Greg; Schwarz, Krista
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Drexel University
摘要：We trace the evolution of extreme illiquidity discounts among Treasury securities during the financial crisis, when bond prices fell more than 6% below more liquid but otherwise identical notes. Using high-resolution data on market quality and trader identities and characteristics, we find that the discounts amplify through feedback loops, where cheaper, less-liquid securities flowto longer-horizon investors, thereby increasing their illiquidity and thus their appeal to these investors. The ef...
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作者：Acharya, Viral V.; Eisert, Tim; Eufinger, Christian; Hirsch, Christian
作者单位：Reserve Bank of India; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Deutsche Bundesbank
摘要：We explore the causes of the credit crunch during the European sovereign debt crisis and its impact on the corporate policies of European firms. Our results show that value impairment in banks' exposures to sovereign debt and the risk-shifting behavior of weakly capitalized banks reduced the probability of firms being granted new syndicated loans by up to 53%. This lending contraction depressed investment, employment, and sales growth of firms affiliated with affected banks. Our estimates base...
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作者：Xu, Qiping
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：This paper examines debt maturity management through early refinancing, where firms retire their outstanding bonds before the due date and simultaneously issue new ones as replacements. Speculative-grade firms frequently refinance their corporate bonds early to extend maturity, particularly under accommodating credit supply conditions, leading to a procyclical maturity structure. In contrast, investment-grade firms do not manage their maturity in the same manner. I exploit the protection perio...
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作者：Feldhutter, Peter; Schaefer, Stephen M.
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Are standard structural models able to explain credit spreads on corporate bonds? In contrast to much of the literature, we find that the Black-Cox model matches the level of investmentgrade spreads well. Model spreads for speculative-grade debt are too low, and we find that bond illiquidity contributes to this underpricing. Our analysis makes use of a new approach for calibrating the model to historical default rates that leads to more precise estimates of investment-grade default probabiliti...
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作者：Rodano, Giacomo; Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas; Tarantino, Emanuele
作者单位：European Central Bank; Bank of Italy; Bocconi University; University of Mannheim
摘要：We analyze howfirms' segmentation into credit classes affects the lending standards applied by banks to small and medium enterprises over the cycle. We exploit an institutional feature of the Italian credit market that generates a discontinuity in the allocation of comparable firms into the performing and substandard classes of credit risk. In the boom period, segmentation results in a positive interest rate spread between substandard and performing firms. In the bust period, the increase in b...
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作者：Malmendier, Ulrike; Moretti, Enrico; Peters, Florian S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We propose a novel approach for measuring returns to mergers. In a new data set of close bidding contests, we use losers' post-merger performance to construct the counterfactual performance of winners had they not won the contest. Stock returns of winners and losers closely track each other over the 36 months before the merger, corroborating our identification approach. Bidders are also very similar in terms of Tobins q, profitability, and other accounting measures. Over the 3 years after the ...
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作者：Li, Kai; Liu, Tingting; Wu, Juan (Julie)
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Creighton University; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：We examine whether, how, and why acquirer shareholder voting matters. We show that acquirers with low institutional ownership, high deal risk, and high agency costs are more likely to bypass shareholder voting. Such acquirers have lower announcement returns and make higher offers than those who do not. To avoid a shareholder vote, acquirers increase equity issuance and cut payouts to raise the portion of cash in mixed-payment deals. Employing a regression discontinuity design, we show a positi...
