Shareholder-Creditor Conflict and Payout Policy: Evidence from Mergers between Lenders and Shareholders

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chu, Yongqiang
• 署名单位: University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhx142
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 3098
• 关键词: information-content; DIVIDEND CHANGES; FIRMS; returns; debt; RISK

摘要

This paper studies how the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors affects corporate payout policy. Using mergers between lenders and equity holders of the same firm as shocks to the shareholder-creditor conflict, I find that firms pay out less when there is less conflict between shareholders and creditors, suggesting that the shareholder-creditor conflict induces firms to pay out more at the expense of creditors. The effect is stronger for firms in financial distress.