ON THE EVOLUTION OF ALTRUISTIC ETHICAL RULES FOR SIBLINGS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: BERGSTROM, TC
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 58-81
• 关键词: strategic complementarities; games; equilibrium; ECONOMICS; selection

摘要

This paper explores the evolutionary foundations of altruism among siblings and extends the biologists' kin-selection theory to a richer class of games between relatives. It shows that a population will resist invasion by dominant mutant genes if individuals maximize a ''semi-Kantian'' utility function in games with their siblings. It is shown that a population that resists invasion by dominant mutants may be invaded by recessive mutants. Conditions are found under which a population resists invasion by dominant and also by recessive mutants.