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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Li, H; Rosen, S
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Chicago
摘要：We use a two-period matching model with initial uncertainty about productivities of participants to analyze incentives for early contracting or unraveling. Unraveling provides insurance in the absence of complete markets, but causes inefficient assignments. Unraveling is more likely the smaller the applicant pool, the smaller the proportion of more-promising applicants, and the greater the heterogeneity in the pool. Banning early contracts hurts firms and benefits less-promising applicants; th...
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作者：Azariadis, C; Smith, B
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We study a one-sector growth model where capital investment is credit financed, and there is an adverse selection problem in credit markets. The presence of adverse selection creates an indeterminacy of equilibrium, Many equilibria display permanent fluctuations characterized by transitions between Walrasian regimes and regimes of credit rationing. Cyclical contractions involve declines in real interest rates, increases in credit rationing, and withdrawals of savings from banks. For some confi...
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作者：Davis, DR
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：I consider trade between a flexible-wage America and a rigid-wage Europe. In a benchmark case, a move from autarky to free trade doubles European unemployment. American wages rise to the European level. Entry of the unskilled South to world markets raises European unemployment. Europe's commitment to the high wage wholly insulates America from the shock. Immigration to America raises American income, but lowers European income dollar for dollar, while European unemployment rises. Absent South-...
