Unraveling in matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, H; Rosen, S
• 署名单位: University of Hong Kong; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 371-387
• 关键词: game

摘要

We use a two-period matching model with initial uncertainty about productivities of participants to analyze incentives for early contracting or unraveling. Unraveling provides insurance in the absence of complete markets, but causes inefficient assignments. Unraveling is more likely the smaller the applicant pool, the smaller the proportion of more-promising applicants, and the greater the heterogeneity in the pool. Banning early contracts hurts firms and benefits less-promising applicants; the effects on more-promising applicants depend on how the gains from early contracts are shared. Ex post buyouts eliminate inefficient assignments, and more-promising applicants always unravel.