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作者：Song, Zhaogang; Zhu, Haoxiang
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Mortgage dollar roll, the most common financing strategy for agencyMBS, differs from repo in that the returned collateral can differ from those received. Also, MBS ownership changes hands in the funding period. We show that dollar roll specialness, how much implied financing rates fall below MBS repo rates, (1) increases in the value of the cheapest-to-deliver option, (2) decreases in the leverage of primary dealers, (3) decreases in prepayment risk exposure during the financing period, and (4...
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作者：Dalkir, Elif; Dalkir, Mehmet; Levit, Doron
作者单位：University of New Brunswick
摘要：Do freeze-out mergers mitigate the free-rider problem of corporate takeovers? We study this question in a tender offer model with finitely many shareholders. Under a freeze-out merger, minority shareholders expect to receive the original offer price whether or not they tender their shares. We show that the ability to freeze out shareholders increases the raider's expected profit. However, as the number of shareholders gets arbitrarily large, the raider's expected profit in equilibrium converge...
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作者：Matsusaka, John G.; Ozbas, Oguzhan; Yi, Irene
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper investigates whether labor unions use proposals opportunistically to influence contract negotiations. Our empirical strategy relies on the observation that proposals have higher bargaining-chip value in contract expiration years, when a new contract must be negotiated. We find that in contract expiration years compared with nonexpiration years, unions increase their proposal rate by one-fifth, particularly proposals concerning executive compensation. Union proposals made during expi...
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作者：Calzolari, Giacomo; Colliard, Jean-Edouard; Loranth, Gyongyi
作者单位：European University Institute; University of Bologna; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Vienna
摘要：Supervision of multinational banks (MNBs) by national supervisors suffers from coordination failures. We show that supranational supervision solves this problem and decreases the public costs of an MNB's failure, taking its organizational structure as given. However, the MNB strategically adjusts its structure to supranational supervision. It converts its subsidiary into a branch (or vice versa) to reduce supervisory monitoring. We identify the cases in which this endogenous reaction leads to ...
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作者：De Simone, Lisa; Piotroski, Joseph D.; Tomy, Rimmy E.
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Chicago
摘要：We examine whether an anticipated reduction in future repatriation taxes affects the amount of cash U.S. multinationals hold overseas. We find that the expected benefits of a repatriation tax reduction are positively associated with accelerated accumulations of global cash holdings once Congress proposed legislation. Additional tests examining domestic and foreign corporations, voluntary disclosures of foreign cash, and corporate payout behavior support our conclusion that observed increases i...
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作者：Bird, Andrew; Karolyi, Stephen A.; Ruchti, Thomas G.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：To mitigate holdup by an informed incumbent lender, a private borrower may publicly share information in order to increase lender competition. Despite proprietary costs, a subset of private borrowers voluntarily share private information in loan and credit underwriting agreements. These borrowers switch lenders at a 16% higher rate and receive lower loan financing costs. For private firms that go public, we analyze changes in the net benefits of information sharing and study the potential esti...
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作者：Bach, Laurent; Metzger, Daniel
作者单位：ESSEC Business School; Stockholm School of Economics; Swedish House of Finance
摘要：We show that close votes on shareholder proposals are disproportionately more likely to be won by management than by shareholder activists. Using a sample of shareholder proposals from 2003 to 2016, we uncover a large and discontinuous drop in the density of voting results at the 50% threshold. We document similar patterns for say on pay votes and director elections. Our findings imply that shareholder influence through voting is limited by managerial opposition. It also follows that one canno...
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作者：Jacob, Martin; Michaely, Roni; Mueller, Maximilian A.
作者单位：WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; University of Geneva
摘要：Consumers nominally pay the consumption tax, but theoretical and empirical evidence is mixed on whether corporations partly shoulder this burden, thereby affecting corporate investment. Using a quasi-natural experiment, we show that consumption taxes decrease investment. Firms facing more elastic demand decrease investment more strongly, because they bear more of the consumption tax. We corroborate the validity of our findings using 86 consumption tax changes in a cross-country panel. We docum...
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作者：Hoffmann, Peter; Langfield, Sam; Pierobon, Federico; Vuillemey, Guillaume
作者单位：European Central Bank; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We study the allocation of interest rate risk within the European banking sector using novel data. Banks' exposure to interest rate risk is small on aggregate, but heterogeneous in the cross-section. Contrary to conventional wisdom, net worth is increasing in interest rates for approximately half of the institutions in our sample. Cross-sectional variation in banks' exposures is driven by cross-country differences in loan-rate fixation conventions for mortgages. Banks use derivatives to partia...
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作者：Larrain, Borja; Sertsios, Giorgo; Urzua, Francisco, I
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Universidad de los Andes - Chile; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：We propose a novel identification strategy for estimating the effects of business group affiliation. We study two-firm business groups, some of which split up during the sample period, leaving some firms as stand-alone firms. We instrument for stand-alone status using shocks to the industry of the other group firm. We find that firms that become stand-alone reduce leverage and investment. Consistent with collateral cross-pledging, the effects are more pronounced when the other firm had high ta...
