Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calzolari, Giacomo; Colliard, Jean-Edouard; Loranth, Gyongyi
• 署名单位: European University Institute; University of Bologna; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhy116
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2997
• 关键词: Capital requirements; FINANCIAL SYNERGIES; RISK; regulators; ABROAD

摘要

Supervision of multinational banks (MNBs) by national supervisors suffers from coordination failures. We show that supranational supervision solves this problem and decreases the public costs of an MNB's failure, taking its organizational structure as given. However, the MNB strategically adjusts its structure to supranational supervision. It converts its subsidiary into a branch (or vice versa) to reduce supervisory monitoring. We identify the cases in which this endogenous reaction leads to unintended consequences, such as higher public costs and lower welfare. Current reforms should consider that MNBs adapt their organizational structures to changes in supervision.