Opportunistic Proposals by Union Shareholders

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matsusaka, John G.; Ozbas, Oguzhan; Yi, Irene
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhy125
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 3215
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; Activism; LABOR; TIES

摘要

This paper investigates whether labor unions use proposals opportunistically to influence contract negotiations. Our empirical strategy relies on the observation that proposals have higher bargaining-chip value in contract expiration years, when a new contract must be negotiated. We find that in contract expiration years compared with nonexpiration years, unions increase their proposal rate by one-fifth, particularly proposals concerning executive compensation. Union proposals made during expiration years are less likely to be supported by other shareholders or a leading proxy advisor; the market reacts negatively to union proposals in expiration years; and withdrawn union proposals are accompanied by higher wage settlements.