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作者：Rasmusen, EB; Ramseyer, JM; Wiley, JS Jr
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
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作者：Hellmann, TF; Murdock, KC; Stiglitz, JE
作者单位：Stanford University; McKinsey & Company; The World Bank
摘要：In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, since they fa...
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作者：Acemoglu, D; Verdier, T
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS)
摘要：Because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another, it creates room for corruption. As corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention, governments Mill try to prevent it. They may create rents for bureaucrats, induce a misallocation of resources, and increase the size of the bureaucracy. Since preventing all corruption is excessively costly, second-best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes. When corruption is harder...
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作者：Cameron, LJ
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作者：Bénabou, R
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University
摘要：This paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance, fiscal redistribution, mid education finance as those. of the United States and Western Europe. With imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare, and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality. Conversely, wit...
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作者：Johnson, DG
作者单位：University of Chicago
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作者：Bolton, GE; Ockenfels, A
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Otto von Guericke University
摘要：We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator games where recip...
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作者：Solnick, SJ; Hemenway, D
作者单位：University of Miami; Harvard University; Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health
