ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bolton, GE; Ockenfels, A
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Otto von Guericke University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.1.166
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 166-193
• 关键词: ultimatum games; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; dictator game; public-goods; fairness; BEHAVIOR; COOPERATION; INFORMATION; reputation; preferences

摘要

We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets. (JEL C78, C90, D63, D64, H41).