-
作者:Cameron, LJ
-
作者:Bénabou, R
作者单位:Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University
摘要:This paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance, fiscal redistribution, mid education finance as those. of the United States and Western Europe. With imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare, and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality. Conversely, wit...
-
作者:Mundell, RA
作者单位:Columbia University
-
作者:Parkin, M
作者单位:Western University (University of Western Ontario)
-
作者:Colander, D
作者单位:Middlebury College
-
作者:Johnson, DG
作者单位:University of Chicago
-
作者:Auerbach, AJ; Siegel, JM
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Congressional Budget Office
-
作者:Bolton, GE; Ockenfels, A
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Otto von Guericke University
摘要:We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator games where recip...
-
作者:Goldin, C; Rouse, C
作者单位:Harvard University; Princeton University
摘要:A change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras-adoption of blind auditions with a screen to conceal the candidate's identity from the jury-provides a test for sex-biased hiring. Using data from actual auditions, in an individual fixed-effects framework, we find that the screen increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired. Although some of our estimates have large standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction, the weight of the evidence...
-
作者:Card, D; Krueger, AB
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University