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作者：Hall, RE
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The value of a firm's securities measures the value of the firm's productive assets. If the assets include only capital goods and not a permanent monopoly franchise, the value of the securities measures the value of the capital. Finally, if the price of the capital can be measured or inferred, the quantity of capital is the value divided by the price. A standard model of adjustment costs enables the inference of the price of installed capital. Data from U.S. corporations over the past 50 years...
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作者：Deck, CA
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
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作者：Li, H; Rosen, S; Suen, W
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Chicago; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Committees improve decisions by pooling members' independent information, but promote manipulation, obfuscation, and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences. Committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting. This coarsens the transmission of information, but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing. Each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone...
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作者：Canzoneri, MB; Cumby, RE; Diba, BT
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：The fiscal theory, of price determination suggests that if primary, surpluses evolve independently, of government debt, the equilibrium price level jumps to assure fiscal solvency. In this non-Ricardian regime, fiscal policy-not monetary policy-provides the nominal anchor. Alternatively, in a Ricardian regime, primary surpluses are expected to respond to debt in a way that assures fiscal solvency, and the price level is determined in conventional ways. This paper argues that Ricardian regimes ...
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作者：Banerjee, A; Eckard, EW
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Denver
摘要：We use event-time methodology to study legal insider trading associated with mergers circa 1900. For mergers with prospective disclosures similar to today's, we find substantial value gains at announcement, implying participation by outside shareholders despite the absence of insider constraints. Furthermore, preannouncement stock-price runups, relative to total value gain, are no more than those observed for modern mergers. Insider regulation apparently has produced little benefit for outside...
