Conflicts and common interests in committees

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, H; Rosen, S; Suen, W
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Chicago; University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.5.1478
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 1478-1497
• 关键词: VOTING PROCEDURES; INFORMATION; aggregation; hierarchies; THEOREMS; rules

摘要

Committees improve decisions by pooling members' independent information, but promote manipulation, obfuscation, and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences. Committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting. This coarsens the transmission of information, but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing. Each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on own information. Increased quality of one member's information results in his casting the crucial vote more often. Committees make better decisions for members than does delegation.