-
作者:Hall, RE
作者单位:Stanford University
摘要:The value of a firm's securities measures the value of the firm's productive assets. If the assets include only capital goods and not a permanent monopoly franchise, the value of the securities measures the value of the capital. Finally, if the price of the capital can be measured or inferred, the quantity of capital is the value divided by the price. A standard model of adjustment costs enables the inference of the price of installed capital. Data from U.S. corporations over the past 50 years...
-
作者:Cutler, DM; McClellan, M
作者单位:Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
-
作者:Storesletten, K; Telmer, CI; Yaron, A
作者单位:Stockholm University; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
-
作者:Baker, GP; Hubbard, TN
作者单位:Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
-
作者:Duflo, E
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:Between 1973 and 1978, the Indonesian government engaged in one of the largest school construction programs oil record. Combining differences across regions in the number of schools constructed with differences across cohorts induced by the timing of the program suggests that each primary, school constructed per 1,000 children led to an average increase of 0.12 to 0.19 years of education, as well as a 1.5 to 2.7 percent increase in wages. This implies estimates of economic returns to education...
-
作者:Conlisk, J
作者单位:University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要:An evolutionary game model shows how an equilibrium distribution of competence may evolve wizen members of a population prey on one another but when predatory competence is costly to acquire. Under one interpretation, the competence distribution is an endogenously determined distribution of bounded rationality. An example shows how tricksters and suckers might coexist in the long run. The analysis leads to a curious result about a mired equilibrium for a symmetric, zero-sum game. An increase i...
-
作者:Deck, CA
作者单位:University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
-
作者:Moldovanu, B; Sela, A
作者单位:University of Mannheim; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要:We study a contest with multiple, nonidentical prices. Participants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) affecting their costs of effort. The contestant with the highest effort wins the first prize, the contestant with the second-highest effort wins the second prize, and so on until all the prizes are allocated. The contest's designer maximizes expected effort. Where cost functions are linens or concave in effort it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first pr...
-
作者:Aughinbaugh, A
作者单位:United States Department of Labor
-
作者:Hanushek, EA
作者单位:Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas