Costly predation and the distribution of competence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Conlisk, J
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.3.475
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 475-484
• 关键词: choice; games

摘要

An evolutionary game model shows how an equilibrium distribution of competence may evolve wizen members of a population prey on one another but when predatory competence is costly to acquire. Under one interpretation, the competence distribution is an endogenously determined distribution of bounded rationality. An example shows how tricksters and suckers might coexist in the long run. The analysis leads to a curious result about a mired equilibrium for a symmetric, zero-sum game. An increase in the costs of one or more competence levels has exactly zero effect on the fraction of the population at those levels.