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作者：Brunnermeier, MK; Parker, JA
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University
摘要：Forward-looking agents care about expected future utility flows, and hence have higher current felicity if they are optimistic. This paper studies utility-based biases in beliefs by supposing that beliefs maximize average felicity, optimally balancing this benefit of optimism against the costs of worse decision making. A small optimistic bias in beliefs typically leads to first-order gains in anticipatory utility and only second-order costs in realized outcomes. In a portfolio choice example, ...
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作者：Ihrig, J
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA
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作者：Santos-Pinto, L; Sobel, J
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper suggests a mechanism that describes individuals' positive self-image in subjective assessments of their relative abilities. The mechanism assumes individuals have heterogeneous production functions that determine ability as a function of multiple skills; make skill-enhancing investments with the goal of maximizing their ability; and make ability comparisons using their own production function. Within this framework, the paper provides conditions under which there is positive self-im...
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作者：Saez, E; Veall, MR
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; McMaster University; McMaster University
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作者：Chen, YP
作者单位：DePaul University
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作者：Thompson, P; Fox-Kean, M
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University; University of Houston System; University of Houston
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作者：Kniesner, TJ; Viscusi, WK
作者单位：Syracuse University; Syracuse University; Harvard University
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作者：Cooper, DJ; Kagel, JH
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding truth-wins norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following changes in payoffs that change the equilibrium outcome. Individuals play less strategically following the change in payoffs than inexperienced subjects playing the same game. In contrast, the teams exhibit p...
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作者：Blume, LE
作者单位：Cornell University; The Santa Fe Institute
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作者：Markowitz, S; Kaestner, R; Grossman, M
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; City University of New York (CUNY) System
