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作者：Page, BR
作者单位：Congressional Budget Office
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作者：Dufwenberg, M; Lindqvist, T; Moore, E
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Arizona; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Auburn University System; Auburn University Montgomery; Auburn University
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作者：Iacoviello, M
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：I develop and estimate a monetary business cycle model with nominal loans and collateral constraints tied to housing values. Demand shocks move housing and nominal prices in the same direction, and are amplified and propagated over time. The financial accelerator is not uniform: nominal debt dampens supply shocks, stabilizing the economy under interest rate control. Structural estimation supports two key model features: collateral effects dramatically improve the response of aggregate demand t...
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作者：Ehrenberg, RG
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornell University
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作者：Thompson, P; Fox-Kean, M
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University; University of Houston System; University of Houston
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作者：Becker, GS; Philipson, TJ; Soares, RR
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Chicago; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：GDP per capita is usually used to proxy for the quality of life of individuals living in different countries. Welfare is also affected by quantity of life, however, as represented by longevity. This paper incorporates longevity into an overall assessment of the evolution of cross-country inequality and shows that it is quantitatively important. The absence of reduction in cross-country inequality up to the 1990s documented in previous work is in stark contrast to the reduction in inequality af...
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作者：Osborne, MJ; Rosenthal, JS; Turner, MA
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto
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作者：Saint-Paul, G
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：This paper shows that price rigidity evolves in an economy populated by imperfectly rational agents who experiment with alternative rules of thumb. In the model, firms must set their prices in face of aggregate demand shocks. Their payoff depends on the level of aggregate demand, as well as on their own price and their neighbor's price. The latter assumption captures local interactions. Despite the fact that the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is characterized by a simple pricing rule ...
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作者：Daughety, AF; Reinganum, JF
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We provide a model showing that the use of confidential settlement as a strategy for a firm facing tort litigation leads to lower average safety of products sold than would occur if the firm were committed to openness. A rational risk-neutral consumer's response in a market, wherein a firm engages in confidential settlements, may be to reduce demand. A firm committed to openness incurs higher liability and R&D costs, though product demand is not diminished. We identify conditions such that, if...
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作者：Snyder, JM Jr; Ting, MM; Ansolabehere, S
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coaliti...
