Are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play in signaling games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cooper, DJ; Kagel, JH
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/0002828054201431
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 477-509
• 关键词: group-behavior; entry; INFORMATION; models

摘要

We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding truth-wins norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following changes in payoffs that change the equilibrium outcome. Individuals play less strategically following the change in payoffs than inexperienced subjects playing the same game. In contrast, the teams exhibit positive learning transfer, playing more strategically following the change than inexperienced subjects. Dialogues between teammates are used to identify factors promoting strategic play.