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作者：Masulis, Ronald W.; Mobbs, Shawn
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
摘要：Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these theories using the market for outside directorships to differentiate among inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market-to-book ratios, especially when monitoring is more difficult. These firms make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earn...
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作者：Bao, Jack; Pan, Jun; Wang, Jiang
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper examines the illiquidity of corporate bonds and its asset-pricing implications. Using transactions data from 2003 to 2009, we show that the illiquidity in corporate bonds is substantial, significantly greater than what can be explained by bid-ask spreads. We establish a strong link between bond illiquidity and bond prices. In aggregate, changes in market-level illiquidity explain a substantial part of the time variation in yield spreads of high-rated (AAA through A) bonds, overshado...
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作者：Bertrand, Marianne; Morse, Adair
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：Can psychology-guided information disclosure induce borrowers to lower their use of high-cost debt? In a field experiment at payday stores, we find that information that makes people think less narrowly (over time) about finance costs results in less borrowing. In particular, reinforcing the adding-up dollar fees incurred when rolling over loans reduces the take-up of future payday loans by 11% in the subsequent 4 months. Although we remain agnostic as to the overall sufficiency of better disc...
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作者：Grinblatt, Mark; Keloharju, Matti; Linnainmaa, Juhani
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Aalto University; University of Chicago
摘要：Stock market participation is monotonically related to IQ, controlling for wealth, income, age, and other demographic and occupational information. The high correlation between IQ and participation exists even among the affluent. Supplemental data from siblings, studied with an instrumental variables approach and regressions that control for family effects, demonstrate that IQ's influence on participation extends to females and does not arise from omitted familial and nonfamilial variables. Hi...
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作者：Dharmapala, Dhammika; Foley, C. Fritz; Forbes, Kristin J.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The Homeland Investment Act provided a tax holiday for the repatriation of foreign earnings. Advocates argued the Act would alleviate financial constraints by reducing the cost to U.S. multinationals of accessing internal capital. This paper shows that repatriations did not increase domestic investment, employment, or R&D-even for firms that appeared to be financially constrained or lobbied for the holiday. Instead, a $1 increase in repatriations was associated with a $0.60 to $0.92 increase i...
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作者：Hertzberg, Andrew; Liberti, Jose Maria; Paravisini, Daniel
作者单位：DePaul University; Tilburg University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate: lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing. To isolate the coordination channel from lenders' joint reaction to new information, we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers. We show that lenders, while learning nothing new about the firm, reduce credit in anticipatio...
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作者：Bongaerts, Dion; de Jong, Frank; Driessen, Joost
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tilburg University
摘要：We derive an equilibrium asset pricing model incorporating liquidity risk, derivatives, and short-selling due to hedging of nontraded risk. We show that illiquid assets can have lower expected returns if the short-sellers have more wealth, lower risk aversion, or shorter horizon. The pricing of liquidity risk is different for derivatives than for positive-net-supply assets, and depends on investors' net nontraded risk exposure. We estimate this model for the credit default swap market. We find...
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作者：Manso, Gustavo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Motivating innovation is important in many incentive problems. This paper shows that the optimal innovation-motivating incentive scheme exhibits substantial tolerance (or even reward) for early failure and reward for long-term success. Moreover, commitment to a long-term compensation plan, job security, and timely feedback on performance are essential to motivate innovation. In the context of managerial compensation, the optimal innovation-motivating incentive scheme can be implemented via a c...
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作者：Acharya, Viral V.; Viswanathan, S.
作者单位：New York University; Duke University
摘要：Financial firms raise short-term debt to finance asset purchases; this induces risk shifting when economic conditions worsen and limits their ability to roll over debt. Constrained firms de-lever by selling assets to lower-leverage firms. In turn, asset-market liquidity depends on the system-wide distribution of leverage, which is itself endogenous to future economic prospects. Good economic prospects yield cheaper short-term debt, inducing entry of higher-leverage firms. Consequently, adverse...
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作者：Gopalan, Radhakrishnan; Nanda, Vikram; Yerramilli, Vijay
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：We investigate the effect of poor performance on financial intermediary reputation by estimating the effect of large-scale bankruptcies among a lead arranger's borrowers on its subsequent syndication activity. Consistent with reputation damage, such lead arrangers retain larger fractions of the loans they syndicate, are less likely to syndicate loans, and are less likely to attract participant lenders. The consequences are more severe when borrower bankruptcies suggest inadequate screening or ...
