Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday Borrowing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bertrand, Marianne; Morse, Adair
• 署名单位: Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01698.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1865-1893
• 关键词: household consumption; education

摘要

Can psychology-guided information disclosure induce borrowers to lower their use of high-cost debt? In a field experiment at payday stores, we find that information that makes people think less narrowly (over time) about finance costs results in less borrowing. In particular, reinforcing the adding-up dollar fees incurred when rolling over loans reduces the take-up of future payday loans by 11% in the subsequent 4 months. Although we remain agnostic as to the overall sufficiency of better disclosure policy to remedy payday borrowing, we cast the 11% reduction in borrowing in light of the relative low cost of this policy.