-
作者：Lim, Claire S. H.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We study how two selection systems for public officials, appointment and election, affect policy outcomes, focusing on state court judges and their criminal sentencing decisions. First, under appointment, policy congruence with voter preferences is attained through selecting judges with homogeneous preferences. In contrast, under election, judges face strong reelection incentives, while selection on preferences is weak. Second, the effectiveness of election in attaining policy congruence criti...
-
作者：Cappelen, Alexander W.; Konow, James; Sorensen, Erik O.; Tungodden, Bertil
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); University of Kiel; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW); Loyola Marymount University
摘要：Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in society. This paper reports the results of the first experiment, to our knowledge, to study fairness views about risk-taking, specifically whether such views are based chiefly on ex ante opportunities or on ex post outcomes. We find that, even though many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities, most favor some redistribution ex post. Many participants also make a distinction between ex post in...
-
作者：Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Melbourne
摘要：Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest-suggesting that authority has nonpecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to over-provision of effort by the controlling ...
-
作者：Pop-Eleches, Cristian; Urquiola, Miguel
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：This paper applies a regression discontinuity design to the Romanian secondary school system, generating two findings. First, students who have access to higher achievement schools perform better in a (high stakes) graduation test. Second, the stratification of schools by quality in general, and the opportunity to attend a better school in particular, result in significant behavioral responses: (i) teachers sort in a manner consistent with a preference for higher achieving students; (ii) child...
-
作者：Cloyne, James
作者单位：Bank of England
-
作者：Bouton, Laurent
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This paper analyzes the properties of runoff electoral systems when voters are strategic. A model of three-candidate runoff elections is presented, and two new features are included: the risk of upset victory in the second round is endogenous, and many types of runoff systems are considered. Three main results emerge. First, runoff elections produce equilibria in which only two candidates receive a positive fraction of the votes. Second, a sincere voting equilibrium does not always exist. Fina...
-
作者：Rogerson, Richard; Wallenius, Johanna
作者单位：Princeton University; Stockholm School of Economics
-
作者：Correia, Isabel; Farhi, Emmanuel; Nicolini, Juan Pablo; Teles, Pedro
作者单位：Banco de Portugal; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; Harvard University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
摘要：When the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binds, monetary policy cannot provide appropriate stimulus. We show that, in the standard New Keynesian model, tax policy can deliver such stimulus at no cost and in a time-consistent manner. There is no need to use inefficient policies such as wasteful public spending or future commitments to low interest rates. (JEL E12, E43, E52, E62, H20)
-
作者：Kurlat, Pablo
作者单位：Stanford University
