The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; University of Melbourne
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.4.1325
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1325-1359
• 关键词: hidden costs; DELEGATION; advantage; exchange; benefits; regret; RIGHTS

摘要

Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest-suggesting that authority has nonpecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to over-provision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates underprovide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation choices. (JEL C92, D23, D82)