-
作者：Blum, Bernardo S.; Claro, Sebastian; Horstmann, Ignatius J.
作者单位：University of Toronto; Central Bank of Chile; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：We show that the Armenter and Koren model's firm-product-country results rely on the assumption that export shipment size is independent of firm size, and this assumption is contradicted by the data. When actual shipment sizes are used in the balls-and-bins model, it cannot reproduce the data on single product/single country exporters. Beyond just showing that the shipment size assumption matters to balls-and-bins outcomes, our results highlight the important fact that shipment size is an econ...
-
作者：Card, David; Giuliano, Laura
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Miami
摘要：We evaluate a tracking program in a large urban district where schools with at least one gifted fourth grader create a separate gifted/high achiever classroom. Most seats are filled by non-gifted high achievers, ranked by previous-year test scores. We study the program's effects on the high achievers using (i) a rank-based regression discontinuity design, and (ii) a between-school/cohort analysis. We find significant effects that are concentrated among black and Hispanic participants. Minoriti...
-
作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Miller, David A.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Many communities rely upon ostracism to enforce cooperation: if an individual shirks in one relationship, her innocent neighbors share information about her guilt in order to shun her, while continuing to cooperate among themselves. However, a strategic victim may herself prefer to shirk, rather than report her victimization truthfully. If guilty players are to be permanently ostracized, then such deviations are so tempting that cooperation in any relationship is bounded by what the partners c...
-
作者：Almas, Ingvild; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Salvanes, Kjell G.; Sorensen, Erik O.; Tungodden, Bertil
作者单位：Stockholm University; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
-
作者：Ashraf, Nava; Glaeser, Edward L.; Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Barcelona School of Economics
-
作者：Guriev, Sergei; Melnikov, Nikita
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); New Economic School
-
作者：He, Zhiguo; Krishnamurthy, Arvind; Milbradt, Konstantin
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Northwestern University
-
作者：Nollenberger, Natalia; Rodriguez-Planas, Nuria; Sevilla, Almudena
作者单位：IE University; City University of New York (CUNY) System; University of London
-
作者：Snower, Dennis J.; Bosworth, Steven J.
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW)
-
作者：Gali, Jordi; Monacelli, Tommaso
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Barcelona School of Economics; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We study the gains from increased wage flexibility using a small open economy model with staggered price and wage setting. Two results stand out: (i) the effectiveness of labor cost reductions as a means to stimulate employment is much smaller in a currency union, and (ii) an increase in wage flexibility often reduces welfare, more likely so in an economy that is part of a currency union or with an exchange-rate-focused monetary policy. Our findings call into question the common view that wage...
