作者：Gneezy, Uri; Kajackaite, Agne; Sobel, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Amsterdam; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper studies lying. An agent randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then report any number and receive a monetary payoff based only on her report. The paper presents a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior. In an experiment, we find that the highest fraction of lies is from reporting the maximal outcome, but some participants do not make the maximal lie. More participants lie partially when the experimenter cannot observe their outcomes tha...
作者：Vieider, Ferdinand M.
作者单位：University of Reading
摘要：In this comment on Callen et al. (20141), I revisit recent evidence uncovering a preference for certainty in violation of dominant normative and descriptive theories of decision-making under risk. I show that the empirical findings are potentially confounded by systematic noise. I then develop choice lists that allow me to disentangle these different explanations. Experimental results obtained with these lists reject explanations based on a preference for certainty in favor of explanations bas...
作者：Pons, Vincent
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper provides the first estimate of the effect of door-to-door canvassing on actual electoral outcomes, via a countrywide experiment embedded in Francois Hollande's campaign in the 2012 French presidential election. While existing experiments randomized door-to-door visits at the individual level, the scale of this campaign (five million doors knocked) enabled randomization by precinct, the level at which vote shares are recorded administratively. Visits did not affect turnout, but incre...
