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作者:Bai, Jushan; Ng, Serena
作者单位:New York University; Tsinghua University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要:We consider the situation when there is a large number of series, N, each with T observations, and each series has some predictive ability for some variable of interest. A methodology of growing interest is first to estimate common factors from the panel of data by the method of principal components and then to augment an otherwise standard regression with the estimated factors. In this paper, we show that the least squares estimates obtained from these factor-augmented regressions are root T ...
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作者:Bikhchandani, Sushil; Chatterji, Shurojit; Lavi, Ron; Mu'alem, Ahuva; Nisan, Noam; Sen, Arunava
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; California Institute of Technology; Bar Ilan University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要:We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this age...
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作者:Blume, Lawrence; Easley, David
作者单位:Cornell University
摘要:This paper provides an analysis of the asymptotic properties of Pareto optimal consumption allocations in a stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous consumers. In particular, we investigate the market selection hypothesis that markets favor traders with more accurate beliefs. We show that in any Pareto-optimal allocation whether each consumer vanishes or survives is determined entirely by discount factors and beliefs. Whereas equilibrium allocations in economies with complete ma...
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作者:Pesaran, M. Hashem
作者单位:University of Cambridge
摘要:This paper presents a new approach to estimation and inference in panel data models with a general multifactor error structure. The unobserved factors and the individual-specific errors are allowed to follow arbitrary stationary processes, and the number of unobserved factors need not be estimated. The basic idea is to filter the individual-specific regressors by means of cross-section averages such that asymptotically as the cross-section dimension (N) tends to infinity, the differential effe...
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作者:Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard; Sieg, Holger
作者单位:Carnegie Mellon University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要:We present an equilibrium model of the market for higher education. Our model simultaneously predicts student selection into institutions of higher education, financial aid, educational expenditures, and educational outcomes. We show that the model gives rise to a strict hierarchy of colleges that differ by the educational quality provided to the students. We also develop a new estimation procedure that exploits the observed variation in prices within colleges. Identification is based on varia...
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作者:Rubinstein, Ariel
摘要:What on earth are economic theorists like me trying to accomplish? This paper discusses four dilemmas encountered by an economic theorist: The dilemma of absurd conclusions: Should we abandon a model if it produces absurd conclusions or should we regard a model as a very limited set of assumptions that will inevitably fail in some contexts? The dilemma of responding to evidence: Should our models be judged according to experimental results? The dilemma of modelless regularities: Should models ...
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作者:Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位:Columbia University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Yonsei University
摘要:A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents' collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents, including both uncorrelated and correlated types. In those circumstances, any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion, including the second-best level, can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way robust to many aspects of collusion behavior. The collusion-proof implementation generalizes to a se...