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作者：Davis, Donald R.; Dingel, Jonathan I.
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：Leading empiricists and theorists of cities have recently argued that the generation and exchange of ideas must play a more central role in the analysis of cities. This paper develops the first system of cities model with costly idea exchange as the agglomeration force. The model replicates a broad set of established facts about the cross section of cities. It provides the first spatial equilibrium theory of why skill premia are higher in larger cities and how variation in these premia emerges...
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作者：Sampat, Bhaven; Williams, Heidi L.
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We investigate whether patents on human genes have affected follow-on scientific research and product development. Using administrative data on successful and unsuccessful patent applications submitted to the US Patent and Trademark Office, we link the exact gene sequences claimed in each application with data measuring follow-on scientific research and commercial investments. Using these data, we document novel evidence of selection into patenting: patented genes appear more valuable-prior to...
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作者：Zimmerman, Seth D.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：This paper asks whether elite colleges help students outside of historically advantaged groups reach top positions in the economy. I combine administrative data on income and leadership teams at publicly traded firms with a regression discontinuity design based on admissions rules at elite business focused degree programs in Chile. The 1.8 percent of college students admitted to these programs account for 41 percent of leadership positions and 39 percent of top 0.1 percent incomes. Admission r...
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作者：Coibion, Olivier; Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Hong, Gee Hee
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; International Monetary Fund
摘要：We address how using different censoring thresholds and imputation procedures affects the baseline results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015). Higher censoring thresholds introduce measurement error and outliers that generate wide variability in results across weighting schemes, but methods that explicitly control for outliers confirm the results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015) for all censoring thresholds. We also illustrate how the BIS's approach to imputing missing prices...
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作者：Abowd, John M.; Schmutte, Ian M.
作者单位：Cornell University; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Statistical agencies face a dual mandate to publish accurate statistics while protecting respondent privacy. Increasing privacy protection requires decreased accuracy. Recognizing this as a resource allocation problem, we propose an economic solution: operate where the marginal cost of increasing privacy equals the marginal benefit. Our model of production, from computer science, assumes data are published using an efficient differentially private algorithm. Optimal choice weighs the demand fo...
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作者：Khan, Adnan Q.; Khwaja, Asim Ijaz; Olken, Benjamin A.
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue...
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作者：Criscuolo, Chiara; Martin, Ralf; Overman, Henry G.; Van Reenen, John
作者单位：Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD); Imperial College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We exploit changes in the area-specific eligibility criteria for a program to support jobs through investment subsidies. European rules determine whether an area is eligible for subsidies, and we construct instrumental variables for area eligibility based on parameters of these rule changes. Areas eligible for higher subsidies significantly increased jobs and reduced unemployment. A 10-percentage point increase in the maximum investment subsidy stimulates a 10 percent increase in manufacturing...
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作者：Garcia-Schmidt, Mariana; Woodford, Michael
作者单位：Central Bank of Chile; Columbia University
摘要：We argue that an influential neo-Fisherian analysis of the effects of low interest rates depends on using perfect foresight equilibrium analysis under circumstances where it is not plausible for people to hold expectations of that kind. We propose an explicit cognitive process by which agents may form their expectations of future endogenous variables. Perfect foresight is justified by our analysis as a reasonable approximation in some cases, but in the case of a commitment to maintain a low no...
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作者：Giorcelli, Michela
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper examines the long-run causal effects of management on firm performance. Under the United States Technical Assistance and Productivity Program (1952-1958), the United States organized management training trips for Italian managers to US firms and granted technologically advanced machines to Italian companies. I exploit an unexpected budget cut that reduced the number of participating firms and find that, compared to businesses excluded by the budget cut: performance of Italian firms ...
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作者：Di Tella, Sebastian
摘要：I characterize the optimal financial regulation policy in an economy where financial intermediaries trade capital assets on behalf of households, but must retain an equity stake to align incentives. Financial regulation is necessary because intermediaries cannot be excluded from privately trading in capital markets. They don't internalize that high asset prices force everyone to bear more risk. The socially optimal allocation can be implemented with a tax on asset holdings. I derive a sufficie...
