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作者：Board, Simon; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We propose a model of firm reputation in which a firm can invest or disinvest in product quality and the firm's reputation is defined as the market's belief about this quality. We analyze the relationship between a firm's reputation and its investment incentives, and derive implications for reputational dynamics. Reputational incentives depend on the specification of market learning. When consumers learn about quality through perfect good news signals, incentives decrease in reputation and the...
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作者：Canay, Ivan A.; Santos, Andres; Shaikh, Azeem M.
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper examines three distinct hypothesis testing problems that arise in the context of identification of some nonparametric models with endogeneity. The first hypothesis testing problem we study concerns testing necessary conditions for identification in some nonparametric models with endogeneity involving mean independence restrictions. These conditions are typically referred to as completeness conditions. The second and third hypothesis testing problems we examine concern testing for id...
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作者：Miller, David A.; Watson, Joel
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper proposes a new approach to equilibrium selection in repeated games with transfers, supposing that in each period the players bargain over how to play. Although the bargaining phase is cheap talk (following a generalized alternating-offer protocol), sharp predictions arise from three axioms. Two axioms allow the players to meaningfully discuss whether to deviate from their plan; the third embodies a theory of disagreementthat play under disagreement should not vary with the manner in...
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作者：Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable.
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo; Mierendorff, Konrad
作者单位：Columbia University; Yonsei University; Seoul National University (SNU); University of Zurich
摘要：We develop a network-flow approach for characterizing interim-allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations. Our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi-unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints, both ceilings and floors. Applications include a variety of settings of practical interest, ranging from individual and group-specific capacity constraints, set-aside sale, partnership dissolution, and government license reallocation.
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作者：Dovonon, Prosper; Renault, Eric
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Brown University
摘要：This paper proposes a test for common conditionally heteroskedastic (CH) features in asset returns. Following Engle and Kozicki (1993), the common CH features property is expressed in terms of testable overidentifying moment restrictions. However, as we show, these moment conditions have a degenerate Jacobian matrix at the true parameter value and therefore the standard asymptotic results of Hansen (1982) do not apply. We show in this context that Hansen's (1982) J-test statistic is asymptotic...
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作者：Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Joergen W.
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals' preferences are their private information, a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what w...
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作者：Carvajal, Andres; Deb, Rahul; Fenske, James; Quah, John K. -H.
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Toronto; University of Oxford
摘要：The aim of this paper is to develop revealed preference tests for Cournot equilibrium. The tests are akin to the widely used revealed preference tests for consumption, but have to take into account the presence of strategic interaction in a game-theoretic setting. The tests take the form of linear programs, the solutions to which also allow us to recover cost information on the firms. To check that these nonparametric tests are sufficiently discriminating to reject real data, we apply them to ...
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作者：Antras, Pol; Chor, Davin
作者单位：Harvard University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We develop a property-rights model of the firm in which production entails a continuum of uniquely sequenced stages. In each stage, a final-good producer contracts with a distinct supplier for the procurement of a customized stage-specific component. Our model yields a sharp characterization for the optimal allocation of ownership rights along the value chain. We show that the incentive to integrate suppliers varies systematically with the relative position (upstream versus downstream) at whic...
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作者：Chernozhukov, Victor; Fernandez-Val, Ivan; Melly, Blaise
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Boston University; University of Bern
摘要：Counterfactual distributions are important ingredients for policy analysis and decomposition analysis in empirical economics. In this article, we develop modeling and inference tools for counterfactual distributions based on regression methods. The counterfactual scenarios that we consider consist of ceteris paribus changes in either the distribution of covariates related to the outcome of interest or the conditional distribution of the outcome given covariates. For either of these scenarios, ...
