EVERY CHOICE FUNCTION IS BACKWARDS-INDUCTION RATIONALIZABLE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11419
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2521-2534
• 关键词: TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS; collective choice; excess demand

摘要

A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable.