A THEORY OF DISAGREEMENT IN REPEATED GAMES WITH BARGAINING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miller, David A.; Watson, Joel
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA10361
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2303-2350
• 关键词: Relational contracts; cheap talk; job destruction; Involuntary unemployment; incentive contracts; perfect equilibrium; implicit contracts; SIDE-PAYMENTS; moral hazard; COMMUNICATION

摘要

This paper proposes a new approach to equilibrium selection in repeated games with transfers, supposing that in each period the players bargain over how to play. Although the bargaining phase is cheap talk (following a generalized alternating-offer protocol), sharp predictions arise from three axioms. Two axioms allow the players to meaningfully discuss whether to deviate from their plan; the third embodies a theory of disagreementthat play under disagreement should not vary with the manner in which bargaining broke down. Equilibria that satisfy these axioms exist for all discount factors and are simple to construct; all equilibria generate the same welfare. Optimal play under agreement generally requires suboptimal play under disagreement. Whether patient players attain efficiency depends on both the stage game and the bargaining protocol. The theory extends naturally to games with imperfect public monitoring and heterogeneous discount factors, and yields new insights into classic relational contracting questions.