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作者：Turner, Matthew A.; Haughwout, Andrew; van der Klaauw, Wilbert
作者单位：University of Toronto; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：We evaluate the effect of land use regulation on the value of land and on welfare. Our estimates are based on a decomposition of the effects of regulation into three components: an own-lot effect, which reflects the cost of regulatory constraints to the owner of a parcel; an external effect, which reflects the value of regulatory constraints on one's neighbors; a supply effect, which reflects the effect of regulated scarcity of developable land. Using this decomposition, we arrive at a novel s...
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作者：Rivkin, Steven G.; Hanushek, Eric A.; Kain, John F.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; Stanford University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
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作者：Abramitzky, Ran; Lavy, Victor
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Warwick; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This paper uses an unusual pay reform to test the responsiveness of investment in schooling to changes in redistribution schemes that increase the rate of return to education. We exploit an episode where different Israeli kibbutzim shifted from equal sharing to productivity-based wages in different years and find that students in kibbutzim that reformed earlier invested more in high school education and, in the long run, also in post-secondary schooling. We further show that the effect is main...
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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Samuelson, Larry; Schmeidler, David
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University; Yale University; Reichman University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We argue that the notion of Pareto dominance is not as compelling in the presence of uncertainty as it is under certainty. In particular, voluntary trade based on differences in tastes is commonly accepted as desirable, because tastes cannot be wrong. By contrast, voluntary trade based on incompatible beliefs may indicate that at least one agent entertains mistaken beliefs. We propose and characterize a weaker, No-Betting, notion of Pareto domination which requires, on top of unanimity of pref...
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作者：Bursztyn, Leonardo; Ederer, Florian; Ferman, Bruno; Yuchtman, Noam
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Using a high-stakes field experiment conducted with a financial brokerage, we implement a novel design to separately identify two channels of social influence in financial decisions, both widely studied theoretically. When someone purchases an asset, his peers may also want to purchase it, both because they learn from his choice (social learning) and because his possession of the asset directly affects others' utility of owning the same asset (social utility). We randomize whether one member o...
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作者：Callander, Steven; Hummel, Patrick
作者单位：Stanford University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We develop a model of experimentation and learning in policymaking when control of power is temporary. We demonstrate how an early office holder who would otherwise not experiment is nonetheless induced to experiment when his hold on power is temporary. This preemptive policy experiment is profitable for the early office holder as it reveals information about the policy mapping to his successor, information that shapes future policy choices. Thus policy choices today can cast a long shadow ove...
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作者：Kaplan, Greg; Violante, Giovanni L.
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：A wide body of empirical evidence finds that approximately 25 percent of fiscal stimulus payments (e. g., tax rebates) are spent on nondurable household consumption in the quarter that they are received. To interpret this fact, we develop a structural economic model where households can hold two assets: a low-return liquid asset (e.g., cash, checking account) and a high-return illiquid asset that carries a transaction cost (e.g., housing, retirement account). The optimal life-cycle pattern of ...
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作者：di Giovanni, Julian; Levchenko, Andrei A.; Mejean, Isabelle
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Barcelona School of Economics; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：This paper uses a data base covering the universe of French firms for the period 1990-2007 to provide a forensic account of the role of individual firms in generating aggregate fluctuations. We set up a simple multisector model of heterogeneous firms selling to multiple markets to motivate a theoretically founded decomposition of firms' annual sales growth rate into different components. We find that the firm-specific component contributes substantially to aggregate sales volatility, mattering...
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作者：He, Zhiguo; Milbradt, Konstantin
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper studies the interaction between default and liquidity for corporate bonds that are traded in an over-the-counter secondary market with search frictions. Bargaining with dealers determines a bond's endogenous liquidity, which depends on both the firm fundamental and the time-to-maturity of the bond. Corporate default decisions interact with the endogenous secondary market liquidity via the rollover channel. A default-liquidity loop arises: Assuming a relative illiquid secondary bond ...
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作者：Glazer, Jacob; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Warwick; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：We study a principal-agent model in which the agent is boundedly rational in his ability to understand the principal's decision rule. The principal wishes to elicit an agent's true profile so as to determine whether or not to grant him a certain request. The principal designs a questionnaire and commits himself to accepting certain responses. In designing such a questionnaire, the principal takes into account the bounded rationality of the agent and wishes to reduce the success probability of ...
