NO-BETTING-PARETO DOMINANCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gilboa, Itzhak; Samuelson, Larry; Schmeidler, David
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University; Yale University; Reichman University; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11281
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1405-1442
• 关键词: aggregation; equilibrium; beliefs; welfare; utility

摘要

We argue that the notion of Pareto dominance is not as compelling in the presence of uncertainty as it is under certainty. In particular, voluntary trade based on differences in tastes is commonly accepted as desirable, because tastes cannot be wrong. By contrast, voluntary trade based on incompatible beliefs may indicate that at least one agent entertains mistaken beliefs. We propose and characterize a weaker, No-Betting, notion of Pareto domination which requires, on top of unanimity of preference, the existence of shared beliefs that can rationalize such preference for each agent.