-
作者：Levy, Yehuda John; McLennan, Andrew
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Queensland
摘要：Levy (2013) presented examples of discounted stochastic games that do not have stationary equilibria. The second named author has pointed out that one of these examples is incorrect. In addition to describing the details of this error, this note presents a new example by the first named author that succeeds in demonstrating that discounted stochastic games with absolutely continuous transitions can fail to have stationary equilibria.
-
作者：Myerson, Roger; Weibull, Jorgen
作者单位：University of Chicago; Stockholm School of Economics; Royal Institute of Technology
摘要：When people interact in familiar settings, social conventions usually develop so that people tend to disregard alternatives outside the convention. For rational players to usually restrict attention to a block of conventional strategies, no player should prefer to deviate from the block when others are likely to act conventionally and rationally inside the block. We explore two set-valued concepts, coarsely and finely tenable blocks, that formalize this notion for finite normal-form games. We ...
-
作者：Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv
作者单位：New York University; Brown University
摘要：Harsanyi (1974) criticized the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set for its presumption that coalitions are myopic about their prospects. He proposed a new dominance relation incorporating farsightedness, but retained another feature of the stable set: that a coalition S can impose any imputation as long as its restriction to S is feasible for it. This implicitly gives an objecting coalition complete power to arrange the payoffs of players elsewhere, which is clearly unsatisfactory. While ...
-
作者：[Anonymous]
-
作者：Andersen, Torben G.; Fusari, Nicola; Todorov, Viktor
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; CREATES; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：We develop a new parametric estimation procedure for option panels observed with error. We exploit asymptotic approximations assuming an ever increasing set of option prices in the moneyness (cross-sectional) dimension, but with a fixed time span. We develop consistent estimators for the parameters and the dynamic realization of the state vector governing the option price dynamics. The estimators converge stably to a mixed-Gaussian law and we develop feasible estimators for the limiting varian...
-
作者：Menzel, Konrad
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This paper studies two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the number of market participants grows large. We consider a model in which each agent has a random preference ordering over individual potential matching partners, and agents' types are only partially observed by the econometrician. We show that in a large market, the inclusive value is a sufficient statistic for an agent's endogenous choice set with respect to the probability of being matched to a spouse of a gi...
-
作者：Noeldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：University of Basel; Yale University
摘要：We study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched into potentially productive partnerships. Equilibrium investments and the equilibrium matching will be efficient if agents can simultaneously negotiate investments and matches, but we focus on markets in which agents must first sink their investments before matching. Additional equilibria may arise in this sunk-investment setting, even though our matching market is competitive. These equilibria exhibit inefficiencies ...
-
作者：D'Haultfoeuille, Xavier; Fevrier, Philippe
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：We study the identification through instruments of a nonseparable function that relates a continuous outcome to a continuous endogenous variable. Using group and dynamical systems theories, we show that full identification can be achieved under strong exogeneity of the instrument and a dual monotonicity condition, even if the instrument is discrete. When identified, the model is also testable. Our results therefore highlight the identifying power of strong exogeneity when combined with monoton...
-
作者：Chen, Xiaohong; Pouzo, Demian
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper considers inference on functionals of semi/nonparametric conditional moment restrictions with possibly nonsmooth generalized residuals, which include all of the (nonlinear) nonparametric instrumental variables (IV) as special cases. These models are often ill-posed and hence it is difficult to verify whether a (possibly nonlinear) functional is root-n estimable or not. We provide computationally simple, unified inference procedures that are asymptotically valid regardless of whether...
-
作者：Quercioli, Elena; Smith, Lones
作者单位：Central Michigan University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We develop a strategic theory of counterfeiting as a multi-market large game. Bad guys choose whether to counterfeit, and what quality to produce. Opposing them is a continuum of good guys who select a costly verification effort. In equilibrium, counterfeiters produce better quality at higher notes, but verifiers try sufficiently harder that verification still improves. We develop a graphical framework for deducing comparative statics. Passed and counterfeiting rates vanish for low and high no...
