The Economics of Counterfeiting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Quercioli, Elena; Smith, Lones
• 署名单位: Central Michigan University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA10975
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1211-1236
• 关键词: BARTER

摘要

We develop a strategic theory of counterfeiting as a multi-market large game. Bad guys choose whether to counterfeit, and what quality to produce. Opposing them is a continuum of good guys who select a costly verification effort. In equilibrium, counterfeiters produce better quality at higher notes, but verifiers try sufficiently harder that verification still improves. We develop a graphical framework for deducing comparative statics. Passed and counterfeiting rates vanish for low and high notes. Our predictions are consistent with time series and cross-sectional patterns in a unique data set assembled largely from the Secret Service.