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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Koszegi, Botond; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Central European University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We explore the learning process and behavior of an individual with unrealistically high expectations (overconfidence) when outcomes also depend on an external fundamental that affects the optimal action. Moving beyond existing results in the literature, we show that the agent's beliefs regarding the fundamental converge under weak conditions. Furthermore, we identify a broad class of situations in which learning about the fundamental is self-defeating: it leads the individual systematically aw...
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作者：Milgrom, Paul; Mollner, Joshua
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要：We introduce the test-set equilibrium refinement of Nash equilibrium to formalize the idea that players contemplate only deviations from equilibrium play in which a single competitor plays a non-equilibrium best response. We then apply this refinement to three well-known auction games, comparing our findings to similar ones previously obtained by specialized equilibrium selections. We also introduce a theory of high stakes versions of games, in which strategies are first proposed and then subj...
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作者：Oberfield, Ezra
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Individual producers exhibit enormous heterogeneity in many dimensions. This paper develops a theory in which the network structure of productionwho buys inputs from whomforms endogenously. Entrepreneurs produce using labor and exactly one intermediate input; the key decision is which other entrepreneur's good to use as an input. Their choices collectively determine the economy's equilibrium input-output structure, generating large differences in size and shaping both individual and aggregate ...
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作者：Eeckhout, Jan; Kircher, Philipp
作者单位：ICREA; University of London; University College London; University of Edinburgh
摘要：Two cornerstones of empirical and policy analysis of firms, in macro, labor and industrial organization, are the determinants of the firm size distribution and the determinants of sorting between workers and firms. We propose a unifying theory of production where management resolves a tradeoff between hiring more versus better workers. The span of control or size is therefore intimately intertwined with the sorting pattern. We provide a condition for sorting that captures this tradeoff between...
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作者：Einav, Liran; Finkelstein, Amy; Mahoney, Neale
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Chicago
摘要：We study the design of provider incentives in the post-acute care setting-a high-stakes but under-studied segment of the healthcare system. We focus on long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and the large (approximately $13,500) jump in Medicare payments they receive when a patient's stay reaches a threshold number of days. Discharges increase substantially after the threshold, with the marginal discharged patient in relatively better health. Despite the large financial incentives and behavioral res...
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作者：Du, Songzi
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：I construct an informationally robust auction to sell a common-value good. I examine the revenue guarantee of an auction over all information structures of bidders and all equilibria. As the number of bidders gets large, the revenue guarantee of my auction converges to the full surplus, regardless of how information changes as more bidders are added. My auction also maximizes the revenue guarantee when there is a single bidder.
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作者：Feng, Tangren; Ke, Shaowei
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：The most critical issue in evaluating policies and projects that affect generations of individuals is the choice of social discount rate. This paper shows that there exist social discount rates such that the planner can simultaneously be (i) an exponential discounting expected utility maximizer; (ii) intergenerationally Pareto-that is, if all individuals from all generations prefer one policy/project to another, the planner agrees; and (iii) strongly non-dictatorial-that is, no individual from...
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作者：Masten, Matthew A.; Poirier, Alexandre
作者单位：Duke University; University of Iowa
摘要：Conditional independence of treatment assignment from potential outcomes is a commonly used but nonrefutable assumption. We derive identified sets for various treatment effect parameters under nonparametric deviations from this conditional independence assumption. These deviations are defined via a conditional treatment assignment probability, which makes it straightforward to interpret. Our results can be used to assess the robustness of empirical conclusions obtained under the baseline condi...
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作者：Baillon, Aurelien; Huang, Zhenxing; Selim, Asli; Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Measurements of ambiguity attitudes have so far focused on artificial events, where (subjective) beliefs can be derived from symmetry of events and can be then controlled for. For natural events as relevant in applications, such a symmetry and corresponding control are usually absent, precluding traditional measurement methods. This paper introduces two indexes of ambiguity attitudes, one for aversion and the other for insensitivity/perception, for which we can control for likelihood beliefs e...
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作者：Kitagawa, Toru; Tetenov, Aleksey
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Bristol
摘要：One of the main objectives of empirical analysis of experiments and quasi-experiments is to inform policy decisions that determine the allocation of treatments to individuals with different observable covariates. We study the properties and implementation of the Empirical Welfare Maximization (EWM) method, which estimates a treatment assignment policy by maximizing the sample analog of average social welfare over a class of candidate treatment policies. The EWM approach is attractive in terms ...
