SOCIAL DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL PARETO

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feng, Tangren; Ke, Shaowei
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA15011
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1537-1567
• 关键词: CARDINAL WELFARE; time preference; aggregation; INEQUALITY; ECONOMICS

摘要

The most critical issue in evaluating policies and projects that affect generations of individuals is the choice of social discount rate. This paper shows that there exist social discount rates such that the planner can simultaneously be (i) an exponential discounting expected utility maximizer; (ii) intergenerationally Pareto-that is, if all individuals from all generations prefer one policy/project to another, the planner agrees; and (iii) strongly non-dictatorial-that is, no individual from any generation is ignored. Moreover, to satisfy (i)-(iii), if the time horizon is long enough, it is generically sufficient and necessary for social discounting to be more patient than the most patient individual's long-run discounting, independent of the social risk attitude.