Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Milgrom, Paul; Mollner, Joshua
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA12536
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 219-261
• 关键词: form games

摘要

We introduce the test-set equilibrium refinement of Nash equilibrium to formalize the idea that players contemplate only deviations from equilibrium play in which a single competitor plays a non-equilibrium best response. We then apply this refinement to three well-known auction games, comparing our findings to similar ones previously obtained by specialized equilibrium selections. We also introduce a theory of high stakes versions of games, in which strategies are first proposed and then subjected to a potentially costly review-and-revise process. We demonstrate a sense in which the test-set equilibria emerge from such processes when the cost of revision is small.