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作者：Hellman, Ziv; Levy, Yehuda John
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of Glasgow
摘要：A general selection theorem is presented constructing a measurable mapping from a state space to a parameter space under the assumption that the state space can be decomposed as a collection of countable equivalence classes under a smooth equivalence relation. It is then shown how this selection theorem can be used as a general purpose tool for proving the existence of measurable equilibria in broad classes of several branches of games when an appropriate smoothness condition holds, including ...
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作者：Matsuyama, Kiminori
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Endogenous demand composition across sectors due to income elasticity differences, or Engel's Law for brevity, affects (i) sectoral compositions in employment and in value-added, (ii) variations in innovation rates and in productivity change across sectors, (iii) intersectoral patterns of trade across countries, and (iv) product cycles from rich to poor countries. Using a two-country model of directed technical change with a continuum of sectors under nonhomothetic preferences, which is rich e...
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作者：Ben-Porath, Elchanan; Dekel, Eddie; Lipman, Barton L.
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Boston University
摘要：We show that in a class of I-agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, for each agent i, we construct a simple disclosure game between the principal and agent i where the equilibrium strategies of the agents in these disclosure games give their equilibrium strategies in the game corresponding to the mechanism but where the principal is not committed to his response. In thi...
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作者：Kline, Patrick; Walters, Christopher R.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Structural econometric methods are often criticized for being sensitive to functional form assumptions. We study parametric estimators of the local average treatment effect (LATE) derived from a widely used class of latent threshold crossing models and show they yield LATE estimates algebraically equivalent to the instrumental variables (IV) estimator. Our leading example is Heckman's (1979) two-step (Heckit) control function estimator which, with two-sided non-compliance, can be used to compu...
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作者：Aguiar, Mark; Amador, Manuel; Hopenhayn, Hugo; Werning, Ivan
作者单位：Princeton University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the interactions between sovereign debt default and maturity choice in a setting with limited commitment for repayment as well as future debt issuances. Our main finding is that, under a wide range of conditions, the sovereign should, as long as default is not preferable, remain passive in long-term bond markets, making payments and retiring long-term bonds as they mature but never actively issuing or buying back such bonds. The only active debt-management margin is the short-term bon...
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作者：Fu, Chao; Gregory, Jesse
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the optimal design of subsidies in an equilibrium setting, where the decisions of individual recipients impose externalities on one another. We apply the model to the case of post-Katrina rebuilding in New Orleans under the Louisiana Road Home rebuilding grant program (RH). We estimate the structural model via indirect inference, exploiting a discontinuity in the formula for determining the size of grants, which helps isolate the causal effect of neighbors' rebuilding on one's own reb...
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作者：Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：A sender persuades a receiver to accept a project by disclosing information about a payoff-relevant quality. The receiver has private information about the quality, referred to as his type. We show that the sender-optimal mechanism takes the form of nested intervals: each type accepts on an interval of qualities and a more optimistic type's interval contains a less optimistic type's interval. This nested-interval structure offers a simple algorithm to solve for the optimal disclosure and conne...
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作者：Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas
作者单位：Columbia University; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); California Institute of Technology
摘要：We develop a framework to study the dynamics of vote trading over multiple binary issues. We prove that there always exists a stable allocation of votes that is reachable in a finite number of trades, for any number of voters and issues, any separable preference profile, and any restrictions on the coalitions that may form. If at every step all blocking trades are chosen with positive probability, convergence to a stable allocation occurs in finite time with probability 1. If coalitions are un...
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作者：Trebbi, Francesco; Weese, Eric
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Kobe University
摘要：Insurgency and guerrilla warfare impose enormous socio-economic costs and often persist for decades. The opacity of such forms of conflict is an obstacle to effective international humanitarian intervention and development programs. To shed light on the internal organization of otherwise unknown insurgent groups, this paper proposes two methodologies for the detection of unobserved coalitions of militants in conflict areas. These approaches are based on daily geocoded incident-level data on in...
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作者：Lipnowski, Elliot; Sadler, Evan
作者单位：University of Chicago; Columbia University
摘要：We can often predict the behavior of those closest to us more accurately than that of complete strangers, yet we routinely engage in strategic situations with both: our social network impacts our strategic knowledge. Peer-confirming equilibrium describes the behavioral consequences of this intuition in a noncooperative game. We augment a game with a network to represent strategic information: if two players are linked in the network, they have correct conjectures about each others' strategies....
