Peer-Confirming Equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lipnowski, Elliot; Sadler, Evan
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA15597
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 567-591
• 关键词: rationalizable conjectural equilibrium; PAIRWISE EPISTEMIC CONDITIONS; social networks; global games; COORDINATION; nash; MODEL

摘要

We can often predict the behavior of those closest to us more accurately than that of complete strangers, yet we routinely engage in strategic situations with both: our social network impacts our strategic knowledge. Peer-confirming equilibrium describes the behavioral consequences of this intuition in a noncooperative game. We augment a game with a network to represent strategic information: if two players are linked in the network, they have correct conjectures about each others' strategies. In peer-confirming equilibrium, there is common belief that players (i) behave rationally and (ii) correctly anticipate neighbors' play. In simultaneous-move games, adding links to the network always restricts the set of outcomes. In dynamic games, the outcome set may vary non-monotonically with the network because the actions of well-connected players help poorly-connected players coordinate. This solution concept provides a useful language for studying public good provision, highlights a new channel through which central individuals facilitate coordination, and delineates possible sources of miscoordination in protests and coups.