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作者：Beraja, Martin; Hurst, Erik; Ospina, Juan
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Chicago; Banco de la Republica Colombia
摘要：Making inferences about aggregate business cycles from regional variation alone is difficult because of economic channels and shocks that differ between regional and aggregate economies. However, we argue that regional business cycles contain valuable information that can help discipline models of aggregate fluctuations. We begin by documenting a strong relationship across U.S. states between local employment and wage growth during the Great Recession. This relationship is much weaker in U.S. ...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Hellman, Ziv; Levy, Yehuda John
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of Glasgow
摘要：A general selection theorem is presented constructing a measurable mapping from a state space to a parameter space under the assumption that the state space can be decomposed as a collection of countable equivalence classes under a smooth equivalence relation. It is then shown how this selection theorem can be used as a general purpose tool for proving the existence of measurable equilibria in broad classes of several branches of games when an appropriate smoothness condition holds, including ...
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作者：Sentana, Enrique
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作者：Bayer, Christian; Luetticke, Ralph; Lien Pham-Dao; Tjaden, Volker
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of London; University College London; Deutsche Bundesbank
摘要：Households face large income uncertainty that varies substantially over the business cycle. We examine the macroeconomic consequences of these variations in a model with incomplete markets, liquid and illiquid assets, and a nominal rigidity. Heightened uncertainty depresses aggregate demand as households respond by hoarding liquid paper assets for precautionary motives, thereby reducing both illiquid physical investment and consumption demand. We document the empirical response of portfolio li...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Gruener, Hans Peter; Troeger, Thomas
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：How should a society choose between two social alternatives if participation in the decision process is voluntary and costly, and monetary transfers are not feasible? Assuming symmetric independent private values, we show that it is utilitarian-optimal to use a linear voting rule: votes get alternative-dependent weights, and a default obtains if the weighted sum of votes stays below some threshold. Any combination of weights and threshold can be optimal. A standard quorum rule can be optimal o...
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作者：Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv
作者单位：New York University; University of Warwick; Brown University
摘要：Harsanyi (1974) and Ray and Vohra (2015) extended the stable set of von Neumann and Morgenstern to impose farsighted credibility on coalitional deviations. But the resulting farsighted stable set suffers from a conceptual drawback: while coalitional moves improve on existing outcomes, coalitions might do even better by moving elsewhere. Or other coalitions might intervene to impose their favored moves. We show that every farsighted stable set satisfying some reasonable and easily verifiable pr...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; He, Wei; Li, Jiangtao; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Singapore Management University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We consider a general social choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of alternatives, independent types, and atomless type distribution. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there exists an equivalent deterministic mechanism that (1) is Bayesian incentive compatible; (2) delivers the same interim expected allocation probabilities and the same interim expected utilities for all agents; and (3) delivers the same ex ante expected social surplus. This res...
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作者：Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Strzalecki, Tomasz
作者单位：Yale University; Harvard University
摘要：We provide an axiomatic analysis of dynamic random utility, characterizing the stochastic choice behavior of agents who solve dynamic decision problems by maximizing some stochastic process (U-t) of utilities. We show first that even when (U-t) is arbitrary, dynamic random utility imposes new testable across-period restrictions on behavior, over and above period-by-period analogs of the static random utility axioms. An important feature of dynamic random utility is that behavior may appear his...
