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作者：Hill, Brian
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：Many decision situations involve two or more of the following divergences from subjective expected utility: imprecision of beliefs (or ambiguity), imprecision of tastes (or multi-utility), and state dependence of utility. This paper proposes and characterizes a model of uncertainty averse preferences that can simultaneously incorporate all three phenomena. The representation supports a principled separation of (imprecise) beliefs and (potentially state-dependent, imprecise) tastes. Moreover, t...
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作者：Kaido, Hiroaki; Molinari, Francesca; Stoye, Jorg
作者单位：Boston University; Cornell University
摘要：We propose a bootstrap-based calibrated projection procedure to build confidence intervals for single components and for smooth functions of a partially identified parameter vector in moment (in)equality models. The method controls asymptotic coverage uniformly over a large class of data generating processes. The extreme points of the calibrated projection confidence interval are obtained by extremizing the value of the function of interest subject to a proper relaxation of studentized sample ...
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作者：Bastianello, Lorenzo; LiCalzi, Marco
作者单位：Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability-based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers' individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the ...
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作者：Matsuyama, Kiminori
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Endogenous demand composition across sectors due to income elasticity differences, or Engel's Law for brevity, affects (i) sectoral compositions in employment and in value-added, (ii) variations in innovation rates and in productivity change across sectors, (iii) intersectoral patterns of trade across countries, and (iv) product cycles from rich to poor countries. Using a two-country model of directed technical change with a continuum of sectors under nonhomothetic preferences, which is rich e...
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作者：Hsieh, Chang-Tai; Hurst, Erik; Jones, Charles I.; Klenow, Peter J.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：In 1960, 94 percent of doctors and lawyers were white men. By 2010, the fraction was just 62 percent. Similar changes in other highly-skilled occupations have occurred throughout the U.S. economy during the last 50 years. Given that the innate talent for these professions is unlikely to have changed differently across groups, the change in the occupational distribution since 1960 suggests that a substantial pool of innately talented women and black men in 1960 were not pursuing their comparati...
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作者：Baldwin, Elizabeth; Klemperer, Paul
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：An Equivalence Theorem between geometric structures and utility functions allows new methods for understanding preferences. Our classification of valuations into Demand Types incorporates existing definitions (substitutes, complements, strong substitutes, etc.) and permits new ones. Our Unimodularity Theorem generalizes previous results about when competitive equilibrium exists for any set of agents whose valuations are all of a demand type. Contrary to popular belief, equilibrium is guarantee...
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作者：Gayle, George-Levi; Shephard, Andrew
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：An empirical approach to optimal income taxation design is developed within an equilibrium collective marriage market model with imperfectly transferable utility. Taxes distort time allocation decisions, as well as marriage market outcomes, and the within household decision process. Using data from the American Community Survey and American Time Use Survey, we structurally estimate our model and explore empirical design problems. We allow taxes to depend upon marital status, with the form of t...
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作者：Balbuzanov, Ivan; Kotowski, Maciej H.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Harvard University
摘要：We propose a new solution for discrete exchange economies and resource-allocation problems, the exclusion core. The exclusion core rests upon a foundational idea in the legal understanding of property, the right to exclude others. By reinterpreting endowments as a distribution of exclusion rights, rather than as bundles of goods, our analysis extends to economies with qualified property rights, joint ownership, and social hierarchies. The exclusion core is characterized by a generalized top tr...
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作者：Garcia-Macia, Daniel; Hsieh, Chang-Tai; Klenow, Peter J.
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
摘要：Entrants and incumbents can create new products and displace the products of competitors. Incumbents can also improve their existing products. How much of aggregate productivity growth occurs through each of these channels? Using data from the U.S. Longitudinal Business Database on all nonfarm private businesses from 1983 to 2013, we arrive at three main conclusions: First, most growth appears to come from incumbents. We infer this from the modest employment share of entering firms (defined as...
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作者：Ben-Porath, Elchanan; Dekel, Eddie; Lipman, Barton L.
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Boston University
摘要：We show that in a class of I-agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, for each agent i, we construct a simple disclosure game between the principal and agent i where the equilibrium strategies of the agents in these disclosure games give their equilibrium strategies in the game corresponding to the mechanism but where the principal is not committed to his response. In thi...
