The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bastianello, Lorenzo; LiCalzi, Marco
• 署名单位: Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13673
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 837-865
• 关键词: utility; nash

摘要

We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability-based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers' individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability.