Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balbuzanov, Ivan; Kotowski, Maciej H.
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA15676
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1663-1692
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; house allocation; assignment; PROPERTY; MARKET; LAW; equilibrium; STABILITY; core

摘要

We propose a new solution for discrete exchange economies and resource-allocation problems, the exclusion core. The exclusion core rests upon a foundational idea in the legal understanding of property, the right to exclude others. By reinterpreting endowments as a distribution of exclusion rights, rather than as bundles of goods, our analysis extends to economies with qualified property rights, joint ownership, and social hierarchies. The exclusion core is characterized by a generalized top trading cycle algorithm in a large class of economies, including those featuring private, public, and mixed ownership. It is neither weaker nor stronger than the strong core.