Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv
• 署名单位: New York University; University of Warwick; Brown University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA16047
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1763-1779
• 关键词: stability; games

摘要

Harsanyi (1974) and Ray and Vohra (2015) extended the stable set of von Neumann and Morgenstern to impose farsighted credibility on coalitional deviations. But the resulting farsighted stable set suffers from a conceptual drawback: while coalitional moves improve on existing outcomes, coalitions might do even better by moving elsewhere. Or other coalitions might intervene to impose their favored moves. We show that every farsighted stable set satisfying some reasonable and easily verifiable properties is unaffected by the imposition of these stringent maximality constraints. The properties we describe are satisfied by many, but not all, farsighted stable sets.